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epistemic condition on moral responsibility: a standalone construct

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epistemic condition onmoral responsibility1 CONSTRUCTEpistemic condition onROSEN · PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

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Philosophy of action

requirement that agents are blameworthy only if they knew or should have known the moral status of what they did, used to argue blame is rarely deserved.

In philosophy of action, epistemic condition on moral responsibility refers to requirement that agents are blameworthy only if they knew or should have known the moral status of what they did, used to argue blame is rarely deserved. This meaning comes from Rosen (2004) in Philosophical Perspectives.[1]

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Nearby constructs

action3 fields · 6 citationsjingle · one word, three constructsblame1 fields · 1 citationsanchor · a standalone constructcondition2 fields · 2 citationsjingle · one word, two constructs

References

  1. Rosen, G. (2004). Skepticism about Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives, 18(1), 295-313. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x

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