Construct · 1 fields · 2 citations

philosophical zombie: a standalone construct

One name. One construct. A landmark on the map.

● anchor · a standalone construct Nearest construct by meaningexperiencecompare the meanings
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philosophicalzombie1 CONSTRUCTP-zombieKIRK · P-ZOMBIE

A single standalone construct; nearby constructs are located against it in the Collider. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.

Philosophy of mind

A being physically identical to a conscious person but with no inner experience

Robert Kirk introduced the philosophical zombie in 1974 (Zombies v. Materialists, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society), coining the word "zombie" in philosophy for a hypothetical being that is physically and behaviourally identical to a conscious person yet has no subjective experience, nothing it is like to be it from the inside. David Chalmers gave the idea its now-standard form in The Conscious Mind (1996), where the mere conceivability of such a being is used to argue that consciousness cannot be fully reduced to physical facts, because a complete physical description of a person would seem to leave open whether any experience is present at all. The construct is a thought experiment rather than a claim that zombies actually exist: its whole force lies in whether a creature exactly like us but empty of inner experience can be coherently imagined. Because it isolates the qualitative, felt side of the mind, what philosophers call qualia, from outward function and behaviour, the philosophical zombie has become a central test case in debates over physicalism, the view that everything including the mind is ultimately physical.[1][2]

Unit
A conceptual being posited in a thought experiment, not a measured quantity
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Specified by conceptual analysis: it is stipulated as a complete physical and behavioural duplicate of a conscious person that wholly lacks subjective experience, and is assessed by whether that description is coherently conceivable rather than by any empirical measurement

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Nearby constructs

qualia1 fields · 3 citationsanchor · a standalone constructbeing3 fields · 3 citationsjingle · one word, three constructs

References

  1. Kirk, R. (1974). Zombies v. materialists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 48, 135–152. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/48.1.135
  2. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.

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