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problem of logical omniscience: a standalone construct

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problem of logicalomniscience1 CONSTRUCTProblem of logicalHINTIKKA · FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY

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Formal epistemology

problem that standard epistemic logics and probability models imply agents know all logical consequences of what they know.

In formal epistemology, problem of logical omniscience refers to problem that standard epistemic logics and probability models imply agents know all logical consequences of what they know. This meaning comes from Hintikka (1975) in Journal of Philosophical Logic.[1]

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References

  1. Hintikka, J. (1975). Impossible possible worlds vindicated. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4(4), 475-484. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00558761

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