Construct · 1 fields · 2 citations

revelation principle: a standalone construct

One name. One construct. A landmark on the map.

● anchor · mechanism design Nearest construct by meaning·not indexed
revelationprinciple1 CONSTRUCTRevelation principleGIBBARD · 1973

A single standalone construct; nearby constructs are located against it in the Collider. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.

Mechanism design

Any outcome can be reached by a mechanism where truth-telling is optimal

The revelation principle says that anything a cleverly designed mechanism can achieve in equilibrium can also be achieved by a direct mechanism in which each participant is simply asked to report their private information and finds it optimal to report truthfully. Gibbard's 1973 Manipulation of voting schemes established the core logic for dominant strategies, and Myerson's 1979 Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem extended and deployed it for Bayesian settings, letting designers restrict attention to incentive-compatible direct mechanisms without loss of generality. The referent is a reduction theorem: it collapses the vast space of possible mechanisms to the tractable class of truthful ones, which is why it is the workhorse of modern mechanism and auction design.[1][2]

Unit
Whether an outcome is implementable by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Invoked analytically to replace an arbitrary mechanism with an equivalent truthful direct mechanism satisfying incentive-compatibility constraints

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Nearby constructs

revelation2 fields · 3 citationsjingle · one word, two constructsattention5 fields · 10 citationsjingle · one name, five constructsbargaining1 fields · 2 citationsanchor · game theory

References

  1. Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4), 587–601. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
  2. Myerson, R. B. (1979). Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica, 47(1), 61–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346

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