Construct · 4 fields · 8 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one word, four constructs Nearest construct by meaninggenuscompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to species is genus.
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In logic a species is a kind that falls under a broader kind, its genus, and is marked off from the other kinds under that genus by a defining difference: dog is a species of the genus animal. Aristotle set out this ordering of genus and species in his Categories and Topics (ca. 350 BCE), and Porphyry's Isagoge (ca. 270 CE) turned it into the branching classification later drawn as the Porphyrian tree. The referent here is a rung in a hierarchy of what can be predicated of things, a class fixed by its genus plus its difference, not a breeding population of organisms, a likeness carried to the mind, or a construction in combinatorics.[1][2]
In medieval theories of knowing, a species is a likeness carried from a perceived thing to the mind, the intermediary by which an object becomes present to a knower without the thing itself entering the head. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa theologica (ca. 1274), distinguished the sensible species received in perception from the intelligible species by which the intellect grasps a thing's nature, developing an account rooted in Aristotle's De anima; Leen Spruit's Species intelligibilis (1994) traces the doctrine across the later scholastics. The referent is a mental representation standing between object and knower, not a class in a logical tree, a reproductive group of living things, or a structure counted in mathematics.[3][4]
In biology a species is the basic unit of classification for living things, a group whose members can breed with one another and produce fertile offspring but not with the members of other such groups. John Ray, in his Historia plantarum (1686), was among the first to fix the unit by its breeding true from seed, and Ernst Mayr's Systematics and the origin of species (1942) gave the modern biological species concept, defining a species by its reproductive isolation from others; de Queiroz (2007) reviews how the many later definitions relate. The referent is a population of interbreeding organisms in nature, delimited and counted by biologists, not a logical kind, a likeness in the mind, or a combinatorial object.[5][6][7]
In combinatorics a species is a rule that assigns to every finite set the collection of structures of a given type that can be built on it, in a way that respects any relabelling of the set's elements. André Joyal introduced the theory in Une théorie combinatoire des séries formelles (1981), giving a unified way to derive counting formulas and generating functions from such structure-assigning rules. The referent is a formal, functorial construction in mathematics, its instances tracked by a generating series, and it has nothing in common with a breeding population, a logical kind, or a likeness carried to the mind beyond the shared Latin word.[8]
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