Construct · 1 fields · 4 citations

supervenience: a standalone construct

One name. One construct. A landmark on the map.

● anchor · a standalone construct Nearest construct by meaninggroundingcompare the meanings
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Every construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to supervenience is grounding.

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supervenience1 CONSTRUCTSupervenienceMOORE · DEPENDENCE

A single standalone construct; nearby constructs are located against it in the Collider. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.

Philosophy (metaphysics)

A dependence relation: no difference in the higher-level properties without some difference in the base-level properties

The idea that one family of properties can rest wholly on another, so that things exactly alike in the base properties cannot differ in the dependent ones, traces to G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903), where the goodness of a thing was held to be fixed by its natural features. R. M. Hare (1952) introduced the word supervenience for this relation in ethics, and Donald Davidson (1970) carried it into the philosophy of mind, proposing that mental characteristics depend on physical ones so that no two events can be alike physically yet differ mentally. Jaegwon Kim (1984) then gave the relation its systematic analysis, distinguishing weak, strong, and global forms and clarifying how supervenience relates to, without by itself establishing, reduction. In its general form the relation says there can be no difference in the supervening (A) properties without some difference in the base (B) properties, a one-way dependence that does not require the A-properties to be definable in or reducible to the B-properties. Its distinctiveness is that it states a bare covariation of one level with another that holds independent of subject matter, which is why the same relation now anchors debates in ethics, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics about how higher-level facts stand on lower-level ones.[1][2][3][4]

Unit
A relation between two families of properties (the supervening set and its base set), affirmed or denied of them
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Established by argument: one asks whether two cases could differ in the supervening properties while sharing every base property, and supervenience holds when they could not

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Nearby constructs

reduction5 fields · 5 citationsjingle · one word, five constructsemergence5 fields · 12 citationsjingle · one word, five constructsbase3 fields · 4 citationsjingle · one word, three constructs

References

  1. Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press.
  2. Hare, R. M. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford University Press.
  3. Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79–101). University of Massachusetts Press.
  4. Kim, J. (1984). Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45(2), 153–176. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107423

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