Construct · 3 fields · 6 citations

Where does intuition collide?

One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.

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from Kant's intuition of timeintuition3 CONSTRUCTSSensible intuitionKANT · SENSIBLE INTUITIONIntuitionismBROUWER · CONSTRUCTIVISMIntuitive judgmentSIMON · RECOGNITION

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1781Sensible intuition1913Intuitionism1992Intuitive judgment
2026

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Philosophy

Immediate representation of an object given to the senses

In Immanuel Kant's 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, intuition (in German Anschauung) is the immediate, singular representation through which a particular object is given to the mind, as opposed to a concept, which represents objects only in a general and roundabout way. For Kant human intuition is sensible: space and time are its pure forms, and any object of knowledge must first be given in intuition before it can be thought. Here the word names a direct grasp of a particular through the senses, and it does not mean a fast automatic hunch studied in psychology or the constructive standard for mathematical objects used in logic.[1]

Unit
A single immediate representation of an object given to the mind
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Not measured; argued for by philosophical analysis of how objects are given to the mind

Mathematics and logic

The mind's constructive activity that grounds mathematics

Intuitionism is the philosophy of mathematics founded by L. E. J. Brouwer, who in his 1907 doctoral dissertation and his 1913 Intuitionism and formalism held that mathematical objects are mental constructions built on the mind's basic intuition of time, so a statement counts as true only when it can be constructed and proved, not merely when it is shown to be free of contradiction. On this ground Brouwer rejected the unrestricted law of excluded middle (the rule that every statement is either true or false), and Arend Heyting later gave the resulting reasoning a formal system, intuitionistic logic. Here intuition names the mind's constructive activity that grounds mathematics, which is unrelated to Kant's immediate grasp of a given object or to the rapid judgments studied in psychology.[2][3]

Unit
A mental construction of a mathematical object, accepted only once built
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Not measured; expressed as which proofs and inferences a constructive standard will admit

Psychology

Fast, automatic judgment made without conscious reasoning

Herbert A. Simon argued in his 1992 What is an explanation of behavior? that intuition in people is nothing more than recognition: an expert perceives a familiar pattern and the answer that goes with it comes to mind at once, with no conscious step-by-step reasoning. Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein's 2009 Conditions for intuitive expertise and Kahneman's 2011 Thinking, Fast and Slow set this within a dual-process account, treating intuition as fast, automatic System 1 judgment that can be skilled in some settings and biased in others. Here intuition names a rapid, non-deliberate mental process, not Kant's immediate representation of a given object nor the constructive foundation of mathematics.[4][5][6]

Unit
A single fast, non-deliberate judgment or act of recognition
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Studied by comparing intuitive judgments against outcomes, expert benchmarks, or slower reasoning

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Nearby collisions

heuristic4 fields · 4 citationsjingle · one word, four constructscognition4 fields · 4 citationsjingle · one word, four constructsinference3 fields · 5 citationsjingle · one word, three constructs

References

  1. Kant, I. (1781). Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of pure reason]. Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
  2. Brouwer, L. E. J. (1913). Intuitionism and formalism. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 20(2), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1913-02440-6
  3. Heyting, A. (1930). Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik. Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Physikalisch-mathematische Klasse, 42–56.
  4. Simon, H. A. (1992). What is an explanation of behavior? Psychological Science, 3(3), 150–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00017.x
  5. Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64(6), 515–526. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016755
  6. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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