Construct · 1 fields · 3 citations

akrasia: a standalone construct

One name. One construct. A landmark on the map.

● anchor · a standalone construct Nearest construct by meaningjudgmentcompare the meanings
How to read this

Every construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to akrasia is judgment.

Hold this as a prompt, not a verdict. Two constructs sitting close in meaning is a reason to read them side by side and decide for yourself whether they are one idea under two names. It is not proof that they are. Compare the meanings in the Collider.

akrasia1 CONSTRUCTAkrasiaARISTOTLE · WEAK WILL

A single standalone construct; nearby constructs are located against it in the Collider. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.

Philosophy

Acting against one's own better judgment

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book VII, composed in the 4th century BCE) gave the construct its name and its canonical analysis: akrasia is the condition of acting against one's own considered better judgment, knowing the better course yet pursuing the worse because appetite or desire overrides reason. The puzzle had been raised earlier by Plato's Socrates in the Protagoras, who argued that no one knowingly does wrong and so denied that genuine weakness of will is even possible, treating apparent cases as ignorance of what is good. In the modern era Donald Davidson's 1970 essay "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" recast the problem in terms of practical reasoning, asking how an agent can hold an all-things-considered judgment that one act is best and still intentionally choose another. The construct is a landmark because it names the precise point where knowledge, judgment, and action come apart: the gap between what a person concludes is best and what that person actually does, a gap studied across ethics, philosophy of mind, and later empirical work on self-control and self-regulation.[1][2][3]

Unit
A condition or episode in which an agent's action diverges from their own better judgment
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Identified in cases where an agent knowingly acts against a judgment they themselves endorse as better; in empirical work approximated through failures of self-control and self-regulation

Next

Run it through the Collider, or take the citations with you.

See how akrasia sits against neighbouring constructs in the Collider, or export every reference on this page in one click.

Open in ColliderExport BibTeXReport this entry

Nearby constructs

self-control4 fields · 6 citationsjingle · one term, three theoriesself-regulation4 fields · 4 citationsjingle · one word, four constructsaction3 fields · 6 citationsjingle · one word, three constructs

References

  1. Aristotle. (2000). Nicomachean ethics (R. Crisp, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work composed ca. 350 B.C.E.)
  2. Plato. (1997). Protagoras (S. Lombardo & K. Bell, Trans.). In J. M. Cooper (Ed.), Plato: Complete works. Hackett. (Original work composed ca. 380 B.C.E.)
  3. Davidson, D. (2001). How is weakness of the will possible? In Essays on actions and events. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1970) https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0002

Cited on this page?

Confirm your construct, or correct us.

If your work is cited behind one of these entries, you know better than we do whether we captured the meaning right. Confirm it, suggest an edit, or dispute it, and your name goes on the entry as an author who has checked it, linked to your ORCID.

Claim your construct