coalition: one construct, many systems

In cooperative game theory a coalition is any subset of players who agree to coordinate their strategies, and the theory assigns each possible coalition a worth through a characteristic function describing what it can secure on its own. von Neumann and Morgenstern's 1944 Theory of games and economic behavior founded this analysis, asking which coalitions will form and how their joint gains are divided among members. The referent is an abstract object (a set of players plus the value they command together), and solution concepts such as the core and stable sets are defined in terms of which coalitions could profitably break away.[1]

Unit

The worth a subset of players can guarantee, via the characteristic function

Recovery means

Not applicable

Measured by

Analyzed through the characteristic function and solution concepts (core, stable sets, value) over the coalitions

In political sociology a coalition is a concrete alliance (of parties, factions, or interested actors) formed to command a majority and then share the resulting rewards, as when parties combine to form a government. Gamson's 1961 A theory of coalition formation predicted that, under a “parity norm,” actors join the cheapest winning combination so as to maximize their own share, yielding minimal winning coalitions rather than oversized ones. It is the same construct cooperative game theory abstracts (a set of players and the value they jointly control), here studied empirically as who actually allies with whom and why.[2]

Unit

Which actors combine into a winning alliance and how payoffs are split

Recovery means

Not applicable

Measured by

Studied by observing formed alliances against predictions such as minimal-winning-coalition and payoff-share models