Construct · 1 fields · 3 citations
One name. One construct. A landmark on the map.
● anchor · a standalone construct Nearest construct by meaningthird-person effectcompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to false-consensus effect is third-person effect.
Hold this as a prompt, not a verdict. Two constructs sitting close in meaning is a reason to read them side by side and decide for yourself whether they are one idea under two names. It is not proof that they are. Compare the meanings in the Collider.
A single standalone construct; nearby constructs are located against it in the Collider. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.
Next
See how false-consensus effect sits against neighbouring constructs in the Collider, or export every reference on this page in one click.
Open in ColliderExport BibTeXReport this entryCited on this page?
If your work is cited behind one of these entries, you know better than we do whether we captured the meaning right. Confirm it, suggest an edit, or dispute it, and your name goes on the entry as an author who has checked it, linked to your ORCID.
Claim your construct
Social psychology
Overestimating how widely others share one's own views and choicesLee Ross, David Greene, and Pamela House introduced the false-consensus effect in 1977 in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, defining it as the tendency for people to overestimate how many others share their own opinions, preferences, and behaviors, so that they treat their own choices as relatively common and appropriate while seeing alternative responses as less typical. In one of their studies students were asked whether they would walk around campus wearing a large sandwich-board sign, and those who agreed judged agreement to be the majority choice while those who refused judged refusal to be the majority, each group projecting its own decision onto everyone else. Brian Mullen and colleagues confirmed the pattern across a 1985 meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests, and Gary Marks and Norman Miller's 1987 review consolidated a decade of work and linked the effect to mechanisms such as spending time with similar others and the ease of calling one's own position to mind. The construct is distinctive as an egocentric bias in social perception: it names a measurable error in estimating a consensus, the gap between how common a person believes their own view or behavior to be and how common it actually is, rather than a bias in judging any single other individual.[1][2][3]