Construct · 5 names · 13 citations
Different names. Different fields. One construct. One map.
● jangle · five names, one construct Nearest construct by meaningdeceptioncompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to scienter is deception.
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The mental state a plaintiff must prove to recover for a misstatement under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." The Supreme Court fixed the word in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder in 1976, holding that negligence is not enough and leaving open whether recklessness is; every circuit has since said yes, most under the label "deliberate recklessness". The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 then made scienter a pleading problem: the complaint must state facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of it, which Tellabs in 2007 defined as an inference at least as compelling as any opposing one. Langevoort's 1997 argument that organisations mislead markets through biased collective cognition rather than any one knowing mind is the standing challenge to the construct's individualist premise. This is the tradition that owns the word; the others name the same state without it.[1][2][3][4]
The state of mind that turns a false statement into actionable fraud at common law. Lord Herschell settled it in Derry v. Peek in 1889: fraud is proved when a false representation is made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false, and an honest belief on unreasonable grounds is not fraud. The Restatement (Second) of Torts codified the same three limbs in §526 in 1977 and gave them the name the securities cases borrowed. Hochfelder cited this tradition when it read scienter into Rule 10b-5, so the two are one construct by descent, not analogy. The difference is procedural: here scienter is proved at trial, usually by clear and convincing evidence, with no heightened pleading gate.[12][5][6]
The nearest neighbour rather than another name: the culpability levels that criminal fraud statutes attach to a false statement. Under the Model Penal Code's 1962 scheme a person acts knowingly as to a circumstance when aware that it exists, and recklessly when consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that it does; the two are separate rungs, not one state with two limbs. Federal fraud statutes add "willfully", which the courts read as acting with knowledge that the conduct was unlawful, a layer the civil constructs never require. Criminal scienter is thus the same knowledge-of-falsity core with a higher standard of proof and, in willfulness, an extra element of consciousness of wrongdoing. Its own page is at /intent; the knowledge rung is at /knowledge.[13][7]
The definitional core of a lie in the experimental literature: a deliberate attempt to create in another a belief the communicator considers untrue. DePaulo and colleagues used that formula to select the 120 samples in their 2003 meta-analysis of behavioural cues, and Levine's truth-default theory of 2014 restates it as intentionally, knowingly, or purposely misleading another person, excluding honest mistakes and self-deception by construction. Knowledge of falsity is therefore not something the field measures; it is what the experimenter assigns when instructing a participant to lie. The construct is identical to the law's, but here it is the manipulated variable and the outcome of interest is the cue or the detection judgment, never whether the speaker knew.[8][9]
The assumption, not the element: an offender who knows the statement is false and weighs the gain against the expected penalty. Becker's 1968 model made the decision to offend a comparison of expected utility, so that the probability and severity of punishment, not the offender's conscience, govern the fraud rate. Akerlof and Romer's 1993 "looting" showed the mechanism at scale: when limited liability and guarantees let owners profit by driving a firm to bankruptcy, knowingly false accounting is the equilibrium strategy, and the savings and loan collapse was the evidence. Scienter here is built into the actor by construction, and the only empirical question is whether the incentives made the fraud pay.[10][11]
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