Construct · 5 fields · 11 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one word, five constructs Nearest construct by meaningknowledgecompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to negligence is knowledge.
Hold this as a prompt, not a verdict. Two constructs sitting close in meaning is a reason to read them side by side and decide for yourself whether they are one idea under two names. It is not proof that they are. Compare the meanings in the Collider.
Spokes are fields; dashed arcs are shared lineage. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.
Drag to watch the word get claimed. Each field appears at the publication date of the earliest source cited for it. Tap a year to see which.
Conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 1965 formula at §282, and a cause of action when that conduct causes injury to a person the duty protects. Judge Hand gave the breach question an arithmetic form in Carroll Towing in 1947: an actor is negligent when the burden of precaution is less than the probability of loss multiplied by its gravity. Posner argued in 1972 that nineteenth-century courts had been applying that test all along and that the negligence system's function was to induce efficient care. The construct is a relation between conduct and a standard, not a state of mind, and the defendant's actual awareness is irrelevant to it.[1][2][3]
The lowest of the Model Penal Code's four culpability levels, and the only one the actor need not be aware of. Under §2.02(2)(d), drafted in 1962, a person acts negligently when they should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that an element exists or will result, and the failure to perceive it is a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. The gross-deviation clause is what separates this from the tort construct: ordinary carelessness that would lose a civil suit is not a crime. The Code's default rule makes recklessness the floor when a statute is silent, so negligence must be named to apply, and it grounds a small set of offences such as negligent homicide.[4]
Care that falls below the standard expected of an average practitioner in the same specialty, as judged by physician reviewers reading the record. The Harvard Medical Practice Study fixed the operational form in 1991: Brennan and colleagues reviewed 30,121 New York hospital records and found adverse events in 3.7 percent of admissions, of which 27.6 percent were attributed to negligence on a six-point confidence scale. Localio and colleagues then matched those records to malpractice claims and found that few negligent injuries produced a claim and that most claims did not correspond to a negligent injury. Negligence here is an epidemiological variable with a measured reviewer agreement, and the study's lasting finding is that it and the legal construct pick out different patients.[5][6]
A category the field declines to use. Reason's 1990 taxonomy divides unsafe acts into errors (slips and lapses in execution, mistakes in planning) and violations, which are deliberate departures from rules, and it locates most accidents in latent conditions upstream of the person at the sharp end. His 2000 paper contrasted the person approach, which blames forgetfulness and carelessness, with the system approach, which treats error as a consequence of how work is designed and defends in depth against holes that momentarily line up. Negligence in the legal meaning belongs to the person approach, and Reason's argument is that it explains little and prevents less. The construct closest to it here is the violation, which is chosen, while errors are not.[7][8]
The liability rule that gives injurers an incentive to take precaution up to the point where its cost equals the accident cost it avoids. Calabresi's 1970 book set the goal (minimise the sum of accident costs and the costs of avoiding them) and proposed assigning loss to the cheapest cost avoider. Brown formalised the comparison of rules in 1973, and Shavell's 1987 treatise carried the result: a negligence rule with due care fixed at the efficient level induces efficient care by both parties, but leaves the injurer's level of activity unregulated, which strict liability does not. Negligence here is a policy instrument with a comparative statics, and the standard of care is chosen to make the marginal precaution just worth taking.[9][10][11]
Next
Combine items across the negligence scales to see whether the meanings separate empirically, or export every reference on this page in one click.
Open in ColliderExport BibTeXReport this collisionCited on this page?
If your work is cited behind one of these entries, you know better than we do whether we captured the meaning right. Confirm it, suggest an edit, or dispute it, and your name goes on the entry as an author who has checked it, linked to your ORCID.
Claim your construct