Construct · 4 fields · 4 citations

Where does category collide?

One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.

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Every construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to category is number.

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category4 CONSTRUCTSCategory (being)ARISTOTLE · KINDS OF BEINGCategory (math)EILENBERG · OBJECTS+ARROWSCategory (concept)ROSCH · MENTAL GROUPINGGrammatical categoryCORBETT · NUMBER, TENSE

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2026

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Philosophy

The most general kinds of being

The highest and most general classes under which anything that exists can be placed, and the basic ways a thing can be spoken of: what it is, how much, what sort, where, when, and so on. Aristotle's Categories, in Ackrill's 1963 translation and commentary, sets out ten such headings, with substance as the primary one and the rest describing quantity, quality, relation, place, and more. Later Kant reused the word for the fixed forms the mind imposes on experience, but in both uses a category is a top-level division of reality or of thought. The referent is a supreme class of being or of predication reached by argument, not a rule of grammar, a structure of objects and arrows, or a grouping learned by a mind.[1]

Unit
One of the highest classes under which anything can be said to be
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Identified by philosophical analysis of the different ways a thing can be said to be, not by any instrument

Mathematics

a mathematical structure of objects and composable arrows between them, with associative composition and an identity arrow on each object.

A precise mathematical structure made of a collection of objects and, for each pair of objects, a collection of arrows between them that can be composed whenever their ends meet, with the composition being associative and each object carrying an identity arrow. Eilenberg and Mac Lane introduced the idea in their 1945 paper General theory of natural equivalences, so that whole mathematical settings could be compared by the arrows that map one into another rather than by their internal contents. The referent is a formal system of objects and morphisms defined by axioms, and it has nothing to do with a highest kind of being, a mental grouping, or a class of word forms; the objects here need not be objects in any everyday meaning.[2]

Unit
A collection of objects with composable, associative arrows and identities
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Specified abstractly by listing its objects, its morphisms, and the composition rules the axioms require

Cognitive psychology

A mental grouping of instances

A grouping of objects, events, or ideas that a mind treats as the same kind, letting a person respond to a new instance based on what it shares with familiar ones. Rosch's 1975 study Cognitive representations of semantic categories showed that everyday categories are not neat boxes with sharp edges but are organized around a best or most typical example, so a robin counts as a more central bird than a penguin does. The referent is a psychological grouping held in a mind and measured by how people sort and judge instances, unlike a supreme class of being, a formal structure of arrows, or a dimension of grammar; here a category can have fuzzy borders and a graded centre.[3]

Unit
A grouping of instances a mind treats as one kind, often built around a typical example
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Studied through typicality ratings, the speed and errors of sorting instances, and which examples come to mind first

Linguistics

A grammatical class like number or tense

A dimension of grammatical contrast that a language forces its word forms to mark, such as number, tense, gender, or part of speech, with a fixed set of competing values like singular against plural. Corbett's 2000 book Number treats one such category in depth, showing how languages carve up the marking of one against more than one in strikingly different ways. The referent is a system of contrasting grammatical values built into a language and found by comparing word forms, not a highest kind of being, a structure of objects and arrows, or a grouping a mind learns from experience; the class here lives in the grammar, not in the world or the head.[4]

Unit
A dimension of grammatical contrast with a fixed set of values a word form must select
Recovery means
Not applicable
Measured by
Established by comparing word forms and how they pattern across a language's grammar

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Nearby collisions

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References

  1. Ackrill, J. L. (1963). Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione. Clarendon Press.
  2. Eilenberg, S., & Mac Lane, S. (1945). General theory of natural equivalences. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 58, 231–294. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1945-0013131-6
  3. Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 104(3), 192–233. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.104.3.192
  4. Corbett, G. G. (2000). Number. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164344

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