Construct · 5 fields · 13 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one name, five constructs Nearest construct by meaningbounded rationalitycompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to reasonableness is bounded rationality.
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The external, objective measure against which a defendant's conduct is judged. Vaughan v. Menlove fixed it in 1837: a farmer who stacked hay that caught fire could not defend by saying he had acted honestly to the best of his own judgment, because the standard is the caution a person of ordinary prudence would observe, not the defendant's own. Holmes explained why in 1881, the law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament and intellect, and a person whose conduct falls short is held liable even if their failings are not their fault. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states it at §283 as the conduct of a reasonable man under like circumstances, admitting physical disability and childhood into the circumstances but not stupidity or bad temper. Reasonableness here is a fictional person's conduct, and the fact-finder supplies the fiction.[1][2][3]
The Fourth Amendment's own word: the people are secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and most of the doctrine is an account of what makes one reasonable. Terry v. Ohio in 1968 created the graduated standard below probable cause: an officer who can point to specific and articulable facts that, with rational inferences, warrant a belief that crime is afoot may briefly stop a person, and may frisk for weapons on a reasonable belief that the person is armed. The test is objective (whether the facts available at the moment would warrant a person of reasonable caution) and the officer's subjective good faith is neither necessary nor sufficient. Reasonableness here balances the intrusion against the government's interest, and it is the only meaning on this map that constrains the state rather than a private party.[4][5]
The measure the Uniform Commercial Code substitutes for a fixed rule whenever the drafters could not write one. Good faith under §1-304 for merchants includes the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing; a reasonable time under §1-205 depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action; a foreclosure sale must be commercially reasonable; and §2-302 lets a court refuse to enforce a clause it finds unconscionable when made. Farnsworth showed in 1963 that the Code's good faith and commercial reasonableness are two ways of importing trade practice into the contract, so that the standard is set by what merchants in that line of business actually do. Reasonableness here is a community norm read from the market, not a fictional prudent person or a balance against the state.[6][7]
A disposition toward other people, not a quality of one's own means–end thinking. Sibley drew the line in 1953: a rational person pursues their ends efficiently, and a reasonable person is also willing to take others' interests into account and to be governed by principles they can defend to them. Rawls built political liberalism on that distinction in 1993, reasonable persons are ready to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do, and they accept the burdens of judgment that make disagreement among them permanent. Scanlon's contractualism in 1998 made reasonable rejection the test of moral principle: an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any principle no one could reasonably reject. Reasonableness here is a moral standing among equals, and the reasonable person is a party to an agreement, not a defendant.[8][9][10]
The standard for how much a clinician must disclose before a patient's consent counts. Canterbury v. Spence in 1972 rejected the rule that disclosure is measured by what physicians customarily tell and held that the duty runs to what a reasonable person in the patient's position would consider material to the decision. Faden and Beauchamp's 1986 history traced how that shift moved consent from a professional courtesy to a patient's right, and Beauchamp's 2011 review restated the construct as autonomous authorisation, with reasonable-patient disclosure as its legal proxy. The reasonable person here is a patient, not a prudent actor, and the question is what they need to know, not how they should behave.[11][12][13]
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