Construct · 6 fields · 14 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one name, six constructs Nearest construct by meaningperceptioncompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to hallucination is perception.
Hold this as a prompt, not a verdict. Two constructs sitting close in meaning is a reason to read them side by side and decide for yourself whether they are one idea under two names. It is not proof that they are. Compare the meanings in the Collider.
Spokes are fields; dashed arcs are shared lineage. Tap a field for its definition, unit, and measures.
Drag to watch the word get claimed. Each field appears at the publication date of the earliest source cited for it. Tap a year to see which.
Generated text that is fluent and confident but unfaithful to the input or unsupported by any verifiable fact. Maynez and colleagues fixed the working split in 2020 for summarisation: intrinsic hallucination contradicts the source, extrinsic hallucination adds content the source never contained. Ji and colleagues' 2023 survey carried the split across every generation task, and Kalai and Vempala showed in 2024 that a model calibrated to its training distribution must fabricate some arbitrary facts at a rate tied to how many appear only once. Nothing is perceived here; a hallucination is a property of a string relative to a reference, and the same string is a hallucination or a correct answer depending on which reference you hold it against.[1][2][3]
Plausible high-frequency detail synthesised into an enlarged image from a learned prior, because the low-resolution input does not contain it. Baker and Kanade named the technique in 2002 after proving that reconstruction-based super-resolution hits a hard ceiling as the magnification grows; the only way past it is to recognise what the image is and hallucinate what such things look like. Wang and colleagues' 2014 survey of face hallucination treats it as a mature sub-field with its own benchmarks. This is the one field where hallucination is the deliverable: the output is judged good when its invented pixels look right, not when they are true.[4][5]
An experience subjectively indistinguishable from seeing an object when no such object is present, used as a lever on the nature of perception. The argument from hallucination runs: if the hallucinatory experience is the same kind of state as the veridical one, then even ordinary seeing is not a direct relation to the world. Martin's 2004 disjunctivism refuses the first step, holding that a veridical perception and its matching hallucination share only the negative property of being indiscriminable from each other by the subject. Macpherson and Platchias's 2013 collection maps the positions. No philosopher here needs a patient; the hallucination is a thought experiment about kinds of mental state.[6][7]
Altered perception, thought, and mood produced by a classical psychedelic acting as an agonist at the serotonin 5-HT2A receptor. Nichols's 2016 review fixed the pharmacological definition: a compound belongs to the class if its effects are blocked by 5-HT2A antagonists and if it produces the characteristic visual distortions, altered sense of self, and intact insight that the person is drugged. Carhart-Harris and colleagues' 2014 entropic-brain account reads the same state as a loosening of high-level priors that increases the entropy of cortical activity. The defining feature is a molecule, a dose, and a time course; the experience is typically recognised as drug-induced while it happens, which separates it from the psychiatric meaning.[8][9]
A perception-like experience with the clarity and impact of a true perception that occurs without an external stimulus and is not under voluntary control (the DSM-5 definition); the person usually experiences it as coming from outside. Aleman and Larøi's 2008 monograph fixed the modern research framing: hallucinations occur in every sensory modality, in healthy people as well as in illness, and vary along dimensions of vividness, conviction, and control. Waters and colleagues' 2012 review found that auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia and in nonclinical populations share cognitive mechanisms (inner speech misattributed as external, weak source monitoring) and differ mainly in distress and appraisal. The criterion is a percept in the absence of an object, and the clinical question is what the person believes about it.[10][11]
A percept generated when the brain's prior expectations are weighted too heavily against incoming sensory evidence, so that the prediction is experienced as the sensation. Corlett and colleagues set out the strong-priors account in 2019 within predictive processing: perception is inference, hallucination is inference gone confident. Powers, Mathys, and Corlett had produced the effect experimentally in 2017 by conditioning people to expect a tone with a visual cue; those who hear voices, clinical or not, reported the tone in its absence more often, and computational modelling traced this to overweighted priors. The construct is a parameter in a Bayesian model, and the same parameter shift is supposed to explain the psychiatric symptom, the drug state, and ordinary illusions.[13][14]
Next
Combine items across the hallucination scales to see whether the meanings separate empirically, or export every reference on this page in one click.
Open in ColliderExport BibTeXReport this collisionCited on this page?
If your work is cited behind one of these entries, you know better than we do whether we captured the meaning right. Confirm it, suggest an edit, or dispute it, and your name goes on the entry as an author who has checked it, linked to your ORCID.
Claim your construct