Construct · 6 fields · 13 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one name, six constructs Nearest construct by meaningcamouflagecompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to concealment is camouflage.
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Hiding a fact from another party in a way the law treats as equivalent to lying about it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes in §550 active concealment (an affirmative act that prevents the other from discovering a fact) from §551's non-disclosure, which is actionable only where a duty to speak exists: a fiduciary relation, a half-truth that needs correcting, or a basic fact the other party is known to be mistaken about. The same idea does a second job in limitations law: Dawson showed in 1933 that courts had long tolled the statute of limitations where a defendant fraudulently concealed the cause of action, and the doctrine still requires an affirmative act of concealment in most jurisdictions. Concealment here is conduct by a defendant that satisfies the misrepresentation element of fraud without any false statement, and its boundary is the duty to disclose.[1][2]
The destruction, alteration, or failure to preserve evidence that a party knew or should have known was relevant to litigation. Silvestri held in 2001 that the duty to preserve arises when litigation is reasonably anticipated, not when it is filed, and that dismissal is available where the loss denies the other side a fair trial. Zubulake set out in 2003 and 2004 what the duty demands of a corporate party's electronic records, a litigation hold, counsel's oversight, and the cost of getting it wrong. The 2015 amendment to Rule 37(e) narrowed the remedies for lost electronically stored information: curative measures where a party is prejudiced, and the harshest sanctions only on a finding that the party acted with intent to deprive. Gorelick, Marzen, and Solum's 1989 treatise gave the field its taxonomy of remedies. Concealment here is measured against a preservation duty owed to the court and an adversary, and the question is what inference or sanction follows.[3][4][5]
A person's tendency to keep distressing or negative personal information hidden from others. Larson and Chastain defined self-concealment in 1990 as a trait, built a ten-item scale to measure it, and found it predicted anxiety, depression, and bodily symptoms over and above trauma, social support, and disclosure. Pachankis reframed the problem in 2007 around concealable stigma (an identity or history that others cannot see) and modelled the cognitive, affective, and behavioural cost of monitoring for discovery. Concealment here is a disposition or a situation of the concealer, measured by self-report, and its consequence of interest is the concealer's own health rather than anyone else's loss.[6][7]
Hiding the existence of a message rather than its content. Simmons posed the prisoners' problem in 1984: two inmates may exchange messages only through a warden who reads everything, so they must embed a covert channel in innocent-looking traffic without the warden noticing. Petitcolas, Anderson, and Kuhn surveyed the field in 1999 and separated steganography, where the goal is undetectability, from watermarking, where the goal is robustness of a mark that may be known to exist, and from anonymity, where the sender is hidden rather than the message. Concealment here is an engineering property of a channel measured against a defined adversary, and encryption is not concealment in this meaning because a ciphertext is plainly a secret.[8][9]
Traits that reduce the chance a prey animal is detected or recognised by a predator. Stevens and Merilaita's 2009 review sorted the mechanisms (background matching, disruptive coloration, countershading, masquerade) and argued that each must be defined by how it defeats the receiver's perception, not by how it looks to a human observer. Cuthill and colleagues tested one in 2005 by pinning artificial moths to trees: markings that broke up the body outline survived birds better than the same colours placed away from the edges, a direct demonstration that disruptive coloration works by disrupting edge detection. Concealment here is a heritable phenotype whose value is a survival rate, with no intent, no duty, and no adversary that can sue.[10][11]
Information one party to a transaction has and the other cannot observe, whether about a thing's quality before the deal or about effort after it. Akerlof showed in 1970 that when sellers know a used car's quality and buyers do not, the price reflects average quality, good cars leave the market, and in the limit the market unravels. Holmström formalised the other case in 1979: a principal who cannot observe an agent's effort must pay on outcomes, and any signal that carries information about effort should enter the contract. Concealment here is a structural feature of who can observe what, not anyone's decision to hide, and the remedy is a contract or a signal rather than a sanction.[12][13]
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