Construct · 6 fields · 17 citations
One name. Different field. Different construct. One map.
● jingle · one name, six constructs Nearest construct by meaningreciprocitycompare the meaningsEvery construct on the map is compared with every other by the meaning of its definitions, and the closest one is surfaced here. The nearest construct to retaliation is reciprocity.
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An employer's adverse response to an employee's opposition to discrimination or participation in a proceeding about it. Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it a separate unlawful practice from discrimination itself. Burlington Northern held in 2006 that the action need not touch the terms of employment: it is enough that a reasonable worker would have been dissuaded from complaining, which brought reassignment and suspension without pay within reach. Nassar held in 2013 that the protected activity must be the but-for cause of the action, a stricter standard than the motivating-factor test that applies to status discrimination. Brake's 2005 article argued that the doctrine's coverage is narrower than its purpose, because the fear of reprisal it is meant to remove operates before any complaint is made. Retaliation here is a cause of action with three elements, and its distinctive feature is that the plaintiff need not prove the underlying discrimination occurred.[1][2][3][4]
Undesirable action taken against an organisation member in direct response to their report of wrongdoing. Near and Miceli set out the model in 1985, treating whistle-blowing as a form of organisational dissidence and retaliation as the organisation's response, predicted by the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the whistle-blower's power, and whether the report went outside the organisation. Their measure, refined in Miceli and Near's 1992 book and used by Rehg and colleagues in 2008, asks the whistle-blower to check which of a list of reprisals they experienced (poor appraisal, denied promotion, reassignment, harassment, dismissal) and sums them. Rehg and colleagues found that women reported more retaliation than men and that the whistle-blower's lack of power, not the seriousness of the wrongdoing, predicted it. Retaliation here is a self-reported count of organisational actions, and it is an outcome variable rather than a cause of action.[5][6][7]
Returning harm for harm, either as a strategy that sustains cooperation or as a motive a person carries. Axelrod and Hamilton showed in 1981 that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma the simple rule of cooperating first and then copying the partner's last move outperforms more elaborate strategies, and Axelrod's 1984 book made tit for tat the model of cooperation among egoists: it retaliates immediately, forgives immediately, and is easy to read. McCullough and colleagues fixed the motivational meaning in 1998 with the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations inventory, whose revenge subscale asks how much the offended person wants to see the offender hurt. Bies and Tripp's interview work in 1996 gave the organisational version: revenge as a response to a violation of trust that the avenger experiences as restoring justice. Retaliation here is either a property of a strategy in a game or a self-reported motive, and in neither case does it require a rule that was broken.[8][9][10][11]
The punishment a state threatens to inflict after an attack so that the attack does not happen. Dulles announced in 1954 that the United States would depend on a capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of its own choosing, and the phrase "massive retaliation" named a doctrine. Snyder separated in 1961 deterrence by punishment, which rests on the threatened cost of retaliation, from deterrence by denial, which rests on the capacity to defeat the attack; Schelling argued in 1966 that the threat works only if it is credible, and that credibility can require leaving something to chance or tying one's own hands. Retaliation here is a threatened future act whose value lies in never being carried out, and the field's central problem is whether the threat will be believed.[12][13][14]
A trade measure imposed in response to another country's measure, either as a sanctioned remedy or as a move in a tariff war. Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding lets a member that has won a dispute suspend concessions against a member that fails to comply, at a level equivalent to the nullification or impairment suffered, with arbitration over the amount. Bagwell and Staiger gave the economic account in 1999: large countries set tariffs to shift the terms of trade, the resulting equilibrium is inefficient, and the GATT rules of reciprocity and non-discrimination work as devices that let governments escape it; authorised retaliation enforces the bargain. Retaliation here is a priced, bounded, and often arbitrated instrument, and the distinctive claim is that the possibility of retaliation is what makes the agreement self-enforcing.[15][16]
Punishment motivated by the wrong done, as distinct from punishment aimed at preventing future wrongs. Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson tested the two motives in 2002 by varying, in vignettes, the factors that a deterrence theorist and a just-deserts theorist would care about: people's sentencing choices tracked the seriousness of the offence and the offender's moral culpability, and were largely insensitive to detection probability and publicity, which is the pattern just deserts predicts. The field then distinguishes retribution, a proportionate response by an authority to a wrong, from retaliation, the same response by the victim or without proportion. Retaliation here is a folk motive that the justice system exists to channel, and the empirical claim is that it, not deterrence, drives ordinary judgements of how much to punish.[17]
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